Warren Buffet holdings

Posted by Investipedia | 10:58 PM | | 0 comments »


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Jim: All right, let's get right to it... You have a stock that's at $500 bucks. I get stopped all the time by people who know I love Google, and they say, will you get the guy to spit the stock? I can't afford $500 bucks. Why don't they split it? Right away... tell me how stupid that is?...

Eric Schmidt: This is New York. They can afford $500 dollars...

Jim: I like that, but I actually get this question when I go to, say, North Carolina too...

Eric Schmidt: Well, that's more serious... but we're not going to split the stock... at least not for a while. It's just better... people think that the value of a stock is really the dollars, so we'll keep it higher.

Jim: All right, good. I think that's right. I like individuals to buy one share. BRK-B did the same thing.

Eric Schmidt: It worked really well for him.

Jim: A lot of people feel that you don't provide enough guidance... enough management share...

Eric Schmidt: We don't provide any guidance... that would be the same thing as "none"...

Jim: True, and that's because you...

Eric Schmidt: Because we don't want it to get in the way of running the business... All right, if we starting giving quarterly guidance, all of the sudden, the whole company would start focusing on the quarter, rather than trying to change the world.

Jim: Totally true. I wish other people would do it. Now, there are 31 out of 33 people (i.e., analysts) recommending the stock so clearly it may not have mattered that you're not hand holding us.

Eric Schmidt: Well, these are the smart people...

Jim: Right. No, it's true. Now, information technology and advertising. I think you guys have revolutionized everything. Could you tell me... a lot of people... Goldman Sachs is using a percentage of the GDP (i.e., gross domestic product) that you are... I think that that's a little too... they are... right now, you're 0.7% of the GDP of the United States... yeah, 7 basis points... actually .07%...

Eric Schmidt: That's quite a difference...

Jim: Hey, catch me... Here's what I want to know... There's $600 billion in advertising. Isn't it fair to think that, one day, you'll capture 10% of it?...

Eric Schmidt: Well, we could... And, by the way, the number's larger than the $600 billion. It's about $1 trillion globally... And it's perfectly possible that the online world will be half (i.e., $500 billion), and Google could be 8% of that (i.e., $40 billion). We won't get 100%. And then we don't know how long it will take, but we know that everybody's moving from these traditional mechanisms to more targeted, more measurable ones, and online is where the measurements are.

Jim: Right now, predominantly desktop, but we know that, in countries that are more advanced than us, like Japan, mobile computing... Is your mobile computing going to be up to snuff, and can you make us much money in mobile computing, because the cell phone companies have historically taken too much of a toll?

Eric Schmidt: Well, we can make more money in mobile than we do in the desktop eventually. And the reason is, the mobile computer is more targeted. Think about it. You carry your phone. Your phone knows all about you, right?

Jim: Oh, everywhere.

Eric Schmidt: It knows exactly what you're up to, so we can do a very targeted ad. Over time, we will make more money from mobile advertising. Not now, but over time.

Jim: Okay, now... there are questions that I'm reading about you in the paper. There's a lot of stuff about you guys in the paper every single day... You're competing against the original content players, like The New York Times said earlier this week.

Eric Schmidt: Well we think we send a lot of traffic to them. What actually happens is, people come to Google, and they look for information, and they immediately go to the content provider. And we don't want to disintermediate them out. We want to take them... because we need their content... we need them to be successful. We build advertising products for them, and so forth. So, very much, we maintain that separation.

Jim: Okay, so when I read those kinds of articles, I should just think twice about whether they aren't... Uh, there is a kind of a bias... You know, you guys have gotten so big, I feel that, when I pick up an article... Yesterday, there was an article about how you didn't have (the Republic of) Georgia in the map...

Eric Schmidt: Well that turns out not to be true. We had the same amount of Georgia before the war as after the war. And we're adding more Georgia going forward, because it's such an interesting place.

Jim: Well, I've got people complaining. I do all my show back and forth with GMail. You were out on Monday, GMail.

Eric Schmidt: Well that was just a screw-up... ...and we fixed that. We're not perfect.

Jim: Well, there you go...

Eric Schmidt: ...and we fixed that. We're not perfect.

Jim: Okay, now... I want talk about philosophically... I know we've got some real time here... philosophically... when my daughter got her 5th grade assignment... the first thing that happened was, at the top of the assignment... "you are not allowed to Google it"...

Eric Schmidt: Really?...

Jim: Yes, you're not allowed to Google...

Eric Schmidt: It's like the old thing, "you can't use a calculator"... now you can't use Google?

Jim: Yes, well I was thinking slide rule, but you can't... Talk about the impact...

Eric Schmidt: But kids use Google all the time, because it's a new way of learning. When I was in... when I was growing up, they made me - in Virginia - memorize the names of the capitals of every county in the whole state... completely useless information. It took me a week.

Jim: Completely and utterly...

Eric Schmidt: Today, you just look it up. So people are going from knowing everything to learning how to search very quickly... The kids need to learn how to search, because they're going to have search everywhere. They're going to have little devices that they're going to carry with them like an iPod, that will have all the world's information with them, for their whole lives.

Jim: So you're not worried about intellectual laziness...

Eric Schmidt: No...

Jim: ...because you guys have basically absorbed what it took me four years of college to do, which is how to do thorough research to be able to do a paper, to be able to...

Eric Schmidt: But what's interesting is now, when you walk down the street, there's a question... You can say, wow, that's interesting... you can have the answer. I'm riding the train between here and D.C. and, all of the sudden, I read the history of the train line. I could never have done that before.

Jim: Okay, well... A lot of times I just think that what has happened is that Google has become so powerful that we have taken it for granted, and wouldn't know how to do a lot of things that we...

Eric Schmidt: But see I don't believe in this sort of lazy people, dumb people idea... I think...

Jim: But you've thought about it. Clearly, you had to have thought about it.

Eric Schmidt: No, no... but I actually think people are smarter, because they have access to more information. Google just organizes it. The people are still asking the questions, their still acting based on it, and they have so much more information available to them.

Jim: All right, okay... Now, a lot of people feel... and I know that we're going to spend the next segment talking about what really drives the stock... that, with the 26% growth that you hit for domestic this quarter, that you've tapped out domestically, and that your growth is going to almost entirely have to be international.

Eric Schmidt: Well, by the way, most people would say 26% growth is pretty good...

Jim: (laughing) I agree, but there's 31 analysts who say, listen Jim, you ought to focus on this...

Eric Schmidt: Well, first place, we don't really know what's going on with the global economy, and Google will do better in any kind of slowdown than non-targeted advertising, but we might be affected by it... you never know. The important point is that our model continues to work, as people are shifting from offline to online. And that shift is inexhorible. It's going to happen no matter what.

Jim: Do you think that we're going to see, and I've got a picture of it I believe... Let me do this... Google home page... (pointing to a monitor of the live Google website home page)... Let me do this before we get to the break. If we can get the Google home page up for a second? I think you've revolutionized advertising and I think you know it too... Why can't you sell, "as presented by Anheuser Busch" right here? (pointing to where a advertising banner could be placed at the bottom of the Google home page)... Why don't you sell the home page?

Eric Schmidt: We absolutely could.

Jim: And how much do you think people would pay to be on that page?

Eric Schmidt: Some number of billions of dollars.

Jim: Well, why not do it?

Eric Schmidt: Because people wouldn't like it. We make the decisions based on what the end user wants. We prioritize the end user over the advertiser.

Jim: You're willing to throw away potentially...

Eric Schmidt: We absolutely...

Jim: ...what I believe would be a half a billion dollars in revenue right now by selling that page?

Eric Schmidt: We absolutely are not going to sell that page.

Jim: But, but wait a second. If I'm a shareholder, what kind of attitude is that?

Eric Schmidt: Because you want to be a shareholder for 20 years, and you want every one of those users to come back to Google over and over and over again.

Jim: But the domestic (i.e., revenue numbers) would be jump started like you wouldn't believe...

Eric Schmidt: You could take a magazine and you could print nothing but ads in it and, eventually, people would stop reading it.

Jim: Well, right now, you're far from that. Do you think that we will see, within our lifetime, the international business dwarfing the United States business?

Eric Schmidt: The world is a really big place, and advertising is global. We're already in a majority international, and I think eventually it's going to be 65/35... something like that.

Jim: Right now, it's about, what?... It was 52%...

Eric Schmidt: 52/48... But it's clear to me that the world is... And, by the way, look at the growth of India, look at the growth of China... Big deal...

Jim: All right, stick with me. I've got granular questions about what's going to happen, that the Street needs more than my global, "my kids are lazy because of Google." All right? Stay here...

[commercial break]

Jim: We're talking with Eric Schmidt. I have to tell you, I'm going back with a $750 price target...

Eric Schmidt: I've never seen a Google employee with than many tatoos...

Jim: Well... 'toos are big... 'toos are big. You guys've got to get a little more hip. I would show you my ring here too (pointing to his belly button). I've got a nice ring here... Uh, what do you... I know we were talking in the break. I know you've got some stuff that you wanted to ask me.

Eric Schmidt: Well, I have a real simple question, right... You think the market's going to turn pretty quick here.

Jim: Yes I do.

Eric Schmidt: But when's business going to turn in America, right? Because Google will do well I think as this turns but, you know, things are kind of rocky right here.

Jim: Well, I've got to tell you, the market has always anticipated between six and nine months, in terms of business. For instance, housing right now... I don't mean to get too far afield. I have the CEO of Google here. But the housing market I think is nine months away from a turn... you see those stocks turning. The stocks tell me more. In your particular case, I believe that you will get back to your old prices, because inflation is coming down, and I'll pay more for the out-year earnings. Let me tell you the things that keep me up at night about Google, and what I'm really worried about. It's different from what the analysts are worried about. First of all, I think... when I first started trading... IBM... I never thought anybody could touch them. Big, big, big... and then flat. MSFT... Big, big, big... and then flat. I worry that there's a price... there's a level... where Google just simply can't get any bigger. Your concern on that?

Eric Schmidt: Well, you know, all these tech companies hit something called... they hit the "S curve" and the S curve is basically... they go like this (motioning upward on a climb) and through this very, very rapid growth period, and then slows... and it slows because of laws of large numbers, basically... Just, you know, you're growing, you're adding billions of revenue... You just can't put enough numbers on the board. So the way you solve that problem is by having new businesses. So we're busy working on new businesses. The display business, which is a huge opportunity, which we should become a significant player, but we're not today. We're working very hard on that. Mobile should be a large one. So the way you address that S curve slowdown, in any technology business, is you keep adding other businesses that are growing. And there's enough in advertising...

Jim: But didn't Ballmer think of that?... And Gates?... (from Microsoft) And it didn't seem to work?...

Eric Schmidt: Well, that's a different generation. This is an advertising generation, and advertising is a very, very multi-sector thing. We can do these kind of ads, which we do really well, but there's a lot of other opportunities for us, and they'll organize themselves as the technology allows. Some of them will grow faster than the others, but that's how we address that question.

Jim: Okay... Uh, I used to manage money for INTC executives. In the late 80s, when they decided to switch from a commodity product, to the 86, which became the Pentium, the thing that they saw and recocognized was that they're only enemy would be the government. They literally believed that, one day, they could have 80-90% market share. They were the 20th largest semiconductor company. I worry that, at a certain place, the world... well, certainly the U.S. government... will come down on you, because you're just too darn powerful. Each month, I see your share go up. At a certain level, people are going to go to Washington and say this isn't right.

Eric Schmidt: Well, we've actually talked about this, because our algorithms are doing better, it appears that we're gaining share... Certainly our advertising business... we have the best technology in the business, and so forth... So, how do we behave, right?... We shouldn't behave the way Microsoft did, all right... I think everyone agrees with that. Certainly, I would never do that.

Jim: You're not going to say those nasty things about the Attorney General?

Eric Schmidt: No, no... We're just not going to do that. So how do you be big without being evil, is the way we need to say it. Well, one of the things is that we don't trap end users. So, if you don't like Google... for whatever reason... if we do a bad job for you, we make it easy for you to move to our competitor. We're trying to make sure that a competitive market is maintained by everything that we do.

Jim: I know the Yahoo deal (to work in conjunction with Google for distribution of advertising) which, on the surface looked anti-competitive, isn't.

Eric Schmidt: But look at it. The Yahoo deal is non-exclusive, text ads only. It's a classic outsourcing deal for some of its advertsing. They can choose to implement it or not. It's a good deal for them, it's a good deal for us. That's the kind of deal... And, by the way, they're free to work with whomever else they wish.

Jim: Now, one of the things that's been brought up repeatedly in all the analyst reports - and it was mentioned in conference call - is that you must be seeing some cyclicality. We know the airlines are in trouble... we know that travel's in trouble... we know the autos are in trouble. That has simply been completely and utterly wrong, hasn't it?

Eric Schmidt: Well, it's bizzarre because, while autos are in trouble, because the automobile dealers are really smart, they move to more targeted advertsing to sell the inventory that they have. So we can do well, if people transition to more targeted, more measurable, more ROI-based advertsing. The ones that are being hit, unfortunately, are these non-measurable advertsing things. There's no reason to put money there.

Jim: You should explain... that's newspapers and magazines...

Eric Schmidt: ...and traditional display ads.

Jim: When my kids... when I tell them to read The New York Times, they have no idea what I'm talking about. What they say is they go to Google. That's what The New York Times is. What do you say to the executives at The New York Times, using that as an example, who have a $500 million ad budget, that you are... Why are you not just the parasite?...

Eric Schmidt: Well, in fact, we have a big deal with The New York Times, and with a bunch of other newspapers, for precisely this. And what we do, when people come to Google looking for news, we send them to The New York Times, and we also show some of our ads on their sites, and they get the majority of the revenue. So they make money, both on the traffic coming to them as well our ad system, along with their own advertising.

Jim: All right, now let's speak about the... a question that, again, I'm trying to address all the questions that are holding the stock down in my view. You've got a tremendous... the amount of downloads in YouTube are extraordinary. But over the...

Eric Schmidt: Do you know it's up to 1.3... let's see... 1.3 million minutes ever 10 minutes of upload. In other words, every minute, we're putting that many videos in. It's unbelievable.

Jim: But, at the same time, what advertiser wants to put a 30-second advertisement on YouTube?... Who wants to look at that, versus the advertisements we're using at the Olympics now, which are just gigantic... $1.7 billion in revenue. I mean, isn't it true that people just don't like ads on YouTube?

Eric Schmidt: But we haven't figured that model out yet, right... You're comparing a 50-year-old mature model, which worked really, really well once every four years, right... in the Olympics... or once every two years... versus something which is completely beginning. We know we have enormous amounts of traffic. Literally hundreds of millions of people watching those videos...

Jim: So you're just saying that somebody will figure it out in your organization?

Eric Schmidt: And hopefully, it's going to be us that figures it out. So we're trying different things. We tried pre-roll and post-roll and so forth. Not any one of them is really got it... we've got a couple of new ones coming out in the next month. We'll give them a try.

Jim: You're making so much money that we don't have to worry about it, right. It isn't like it's going to hit your bottom line here...

Eric Schmidt: It does hit our bottom line big time right now... but, eventually, we'd like to make some money at it. But, even if we don't... even if, ultimately, it's a loss leader... let me tell you that the fact that so many people come to YouTube means that they ultimately go to Google and do Google searches and click on ads. So don't be too worried about all that traffic going to YouTube. I'd be worried if people weren't using YouTube... Since it's an enormous success globally, we know we will eventually benefit from it.

Jim: All right, last question to Eric Schmidt, the CEO of Google... I want to know... The press, everyday... It's kind of like the iPhone... Everyone says the Android is coming, the Android... you'll never see anything like the Android... There could be a September release... Here, I'm talking about mobile computing which... Remember, Google is dominating, taking big share from Yahoo, for AOL, from everybody, when it comes to desktop... but owning mobile may be up to you guys developing Android and being successful. Where is it? How big it can be? Can you give me a Steve Jobs' "10 million this year" kind of thing?

Eric Schmidt: No it can't.

Jim: Why not?

Eric Schmidt: Because it hasn't shipped yet.

Jim: Okay, but tell me...

Eric Schmidt: It's going to ship between now and the end of the year. It's software...

Jim: No, no, no... I need "September"... I need "October"...

Eric Schmidt: ...between now and the end of the year, and it's going to be software...

Jim: Well why don't you just take away my ratings, and give them to some other show?...

Eric Schmidt: And, by the way, it's software, so it's really going to be other people... And our goal is to get lots of people to use the software to build a new platform... a completely different kind of platform than anybody else...

Jim: Well, like cloud computing...

Eric Schmidt: Absolutely.

Jim: Oh, by the way, your last... There was a Pacific Crest speech that one of your guys gave that just basically said that cloud computing is interesting, but that Microsoft should be terrified. Should Microsoft be terrified by cloud computing?

Eric Schmidt: I never worry about Microsoft.

Jim: Very smart. Eric Schmidt, you are a delight... CEO of Google... and where's my pen? I want to write Google $750... Well, whatever, you get the point!


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Buy High, Sell Much Higher

Posted by Investipedia | 4:24 PM | 0 comments »

One of the tenets of stock investing that the average investor, as well as the sophisticated day trader, has heard repeatedly is "buy low, sell high". Sounds like a reasonable approach to investing, right?

Unfortunately, it is much more difficult than it seems. This is partly because some rookie investors may equate stock investing with shopping at the mall. If a cashmere sweater costs $250 in December but has been marked down to $50 in July, then it must be a good deal, or have some type of value. Maybe so, but stocks are different. If the price of a stock over the last year or so has ranged from $24 to $60 a share and it's currently trading at around $26, it appears to be cheap - so, it's a good value, right?

Not so fast! Buying stocks that are near or at yearly lows may actually add risk to your portfolio, rather than reduce it.

Why Lows May Not Be a "Deal"

  • Beaten down stocks may never recoup their losses or it may take a very long time for the stock to recover its highs. For example, technology stocks such as Juniper Networks (Nasdaq:JNPR) and Yahoo! (Nasdaq:YHOO) soared during the technology bubble in 2000 - and crashed when it burst. By 2008, these companies had yet to recover to their pre-bubble values.
  • The opportunity costs of holding the stock increases over time - if the stock doesn't recover relatively quick enough.
  • Picking the bottom in a stock is very difficult for individual investors. Many investors are lured into a false sense of security when buying beaten down companies, only to be disappointed as the stock continues to fall.
  • You are betting against the Wall Street conventional wisdom when you purchase a stock that is out of favor. In other words, the stock is cheap for a reason: managers of big money do not see the future value in the company at so-called "cheap" prices. In a sense, they are willing to wait for much lower prices before buying the stock.
A Different Spin on the Buy Low, Sell High Strategy
Some investors may want to adjust their strategies to "buy high, sell higher". That's not a typo. Many traders wisely look for stocks that are near their yearly highs and are in strong industries. There are many resources on the internet that allow the average investor to easily find a list of the strongest stocks and the best sectors. However, it should be noted that it is not a good idea to blindly buy stocks off of the new high list.

Consider these reasons for buying relatively expensive stocks:

  • You are buying a stock that is trending upward, not downward. You are not hoping or waiting on a turnaround story or a buyout. Chances are, your stock has proved its value before you buy it.
  • A stock at or near its high is working with Wall Street money instead of fighting it. And, institutional money moves stocks. Unfortunately, retail buying and selling are not significant market events. Aligning your investments with money managers who manage billions of dollars may reduce the risk that you'll lose a lot of your own money.
  • Cheap stocks tend to trade less frequently. If you own a stock that trades lightly, chances are you may have difficulty finding a lot of buyers at your desired price(s). Stocks that lack volume also lack institutional support. And, as stated above, it's the institutional money that determines stock prices on Wall Street.
  • Making any investment decision solely based on one indicator is not a good strategy. As you find these uptrending stocks in leading industries, one strategy may be to wait for a minor correction of 8-12% before pulling the trigger. This will mitigate the risk of "buying at the top" and therefore provide some cushion for any potential losses that you may incur.
Let's take a look at a well-known company's stock chart over the last few years. In Figure 1, Exxon Mobil (NYSE:XOM) shows a long-term uptrend starting around October of 2006. The oil and gas sectors have been market leaders over this period. On the graph, each circle on the trendline represents buying opportunities along the way. Value investors may have been reluctant to purchase XOM at around $70 per share in early 2007 because at that time, this was near Exxon's all-time high. However, buyers of this stock were rewarded as the shares continued to rise.
Figure 1
Source: StockCharts.com

Conclusion
Some inexpensive stocks are actually true value plays and buying them will result in substantial gains. However, buying cheap stocks is not a risk-free strategy. In fact, your risk of losing money may actually increase over time as the stock loses value or fails to appreciate to your expectations. Consider buying strength, and get in on relatively expensive stocks. The risks are not as great as they appear and the potential for upside is consistently better than bottom fishing for inexpensive stocks.

Source: Investopedia


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Depending on the source and what month it is, Carlos Slim is either the richest, second-richest or third-richest man in the world, with a reported net worth of $53 billion, according to Forbes magazine.

Slim is a Mexican businessman who made much of his wealth in the telecommunications industry in Latin America. He has been the vice president of the Mexican Stock Exchange and the president of the Mexican Association of Brokerage Houses.

If he's so rich, maybe it is time to pay closer attention to what he invests in.

One of the stocks that Slim owns is Allis-Chalmers Energy (ALY), a provider of equipment and services to oil and gas exploration and production companies in Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Wyoming and West Virginia. Standard & Poor's Ratings Services just boosted its ratings for the company to B+ from B. The company is in the process of acquiring Bronco Drilling Company. The stock has a P/E of 11 and a PEG of 0.72.

Allis-Chalmers Energy shows up in a Stockpickr portfolio called Barron's Insider Purchases 3-08-08, which lists the largest insider purchases. Other stocks in the portfolio include General Electric (GE), with a PE of 13 and a yield of 4.4%; Enterprise GP Holdings (EPE), with a P/E of 33 and a yield of 6%; and Eli Lilly (LLY), with a P/E of 15 and a yield of 2.9%.

Another stock of Slim is America Movil (AMX), the fifth-largest mobile network operator and the largest corporation in Latin America, with over 152 million wireless subscribers. The company is expected to post an 8.5% increase in second-quarter net profit. The stock has a P/E of 16 and a PEG of 0.54, and it pays a yield of 4.2%.

America Movil is also owned by Level Global Investors, a $1.7 billion hedge fund managed by David Ganek and Anthony Chiasson, who formerly worked at SAC Capital Advisors. Level Global has a minimum investment of $5 million. It also holds Electronic Arts (ERTS), with a forward P/E of 21 and a PEG of 1.53; Devon Energy (DVN), with a P/E of 12 and a PEG of 1.32; and Qualcomm (QCOM), with a P/E of 22 and a PEG of 1.35.

Another stock owned by Slim is Kraft Foods (KFT), the third-largest food and beverage company in the world and the second-largest based in North America. The stock has a P/E of 19, a PEG of 2.19 and a yield of 3.6%.

Kraft is also owned by the Allianz NFJ Dividend Value Institutional Fund, a Morningstar-rated five-star fund managed by Ben Fisher. The fund has had an average annual return of 14.19% over the last five years. The fund also owns GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), with a P/E of 13 and a yield of 4.3%; Dow Chemical (DOW), with a P/E of 11 and a yield of 4.9%; and Seagate Technology (STX), with a P/E of 5 and a yield of 3.2%.

Source: http://www.stockpickr.com


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When people look at Warren Buffett’s portfolio, they typically want to own the latest stocks he’s been in, and they neglect the older guys. They want to know if Wells Fargo (WFC) or U.S. Bancorp (USB) are the right financials to own. Or if Johnson & Johnson (JNJ) is the right health care stock.

But there is a hidden gem in the older stocks.

First off, let's summarize Buffett's most-recent picks, then find the growth stock that is buried in one of his original value plays.

In Buffett’s most recent filing, he added to his Wells Fargo position. Wells Fargo had been crushed along with the other banks in the subprime mess, but it is probably one of the few banks to have limited subprime exposure early on. The bank is now 50% higher than its recent lows, and while it probably is a buy (particularly with its solid 4.5% dividend), there are better picks among Buffett’s stocks.

Buffett also bought 3 million shares of his favorite railroad play, Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNI). If you have been following his portfolio closely, you had the opportunity to pick up Burlington a year ago at prices lower than Buffett paid, in the low $70s. But with the stock at $102, I’d stay away for the moment, although, again, it's probably still a long-term buy.

However, the long-term pick that Buffett owns that I think is an enormous buy right now is Washington Post (WPO). What!? Isn’t the newspaper industry dead? Doesn’t Craigslist (30% owned by eBay (EBAY)) dominate the classifieds space? Isn’t everyone advertising on Google (GOOG) now or getting the news from AOL (Time Warner (TWX))?

Oh, did we mention that Washington Post is not really a newspaper company? Quick, before reading further, guess where more than 50% of its revenues come from and almost all of its EBITDA? If you guessed the education segment of its business (built off of its Stanley Kaplan acquisition), then you’d be correct.

First off, for the first time in years, the company reported a net income loss due to its retirement program at the newspaper. However, overall revenue was up 6% to $1.106 billion due to “significant revenue growth at the education and cable television divisions.” Revenues were down at the newspaper, magazine and television divisions.

Specifically, the education division revenue was $576 million for second-quarter 2008, up 14% over the same period in 2007. Stanley Kaplan reported income of $47.4 million, up 26% from the $37.5 million recorded in second-quarter 2007. For the past six months, Kaplan had net income of $94 million, up 31% from the year-ago period.

Let's just annualize that to about $200 million in income expected from the education group. Now let's slap a multiple similar to other education companies. Apollo Group (APOL), for instance, has a P/E ratio of 30. That would give the education segment at Washington Post a market cap value of $6 billion were it to be on its own.

The market cap of Washington Post is currently $6 billion.

Which means buying stock in Washington Post gives you The Washington Post, Newsweek, the cable and television business and the Internet business, all for free. I admit that the newspaper industry is struggling. But the brand-name leaders (The Wall Street Journal, which was acquired by News Corp. (NWS); the New York Times; USA Today) will find a way to survive and, worst case, will be sold. Even in a fire sale, The Washington Post would get a value greater than zero.

The cable television business is showing some growth and is profitable ($40 million in operating income in the second quarter.) Annualize that and slap a multiple similar to that of Time Warner Cable (a 26 P/E), and you get $4160 million.

So we are still valuing the entire newspaper and magazine business at zero, and a sum of the parts shows the potential stock at 66% higher than where it currently is.

Value Washington Post wherever you want. It’s a great newspaper, and I highly recommend Katherine Graham’s memoirs to see her experiences of building the paper during the difficult times in the '60s and '70s and when she first met the young Warren Buffett.

Gannett (GCI) and New York Times (NYT) are valued at about a half to two-thirds times sales. That might value the Post newspaper (plus Newsweek) at about $500 million to $660 million.

Well, whatever. It's yours for free now at the current price of Washington Post.
Source: http://www.stockpickr.com


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I’d wanted to read this stock market classic for a long time but it is notoriously hard to find. Finally I bought it through a reseller on Amazon.com. The seller was in England and the book arrived in my mailbox a couple of weeks later. It was worth the wait!

   What adds to the book’s appeal is that, unlike Jesse Livermore, Darvas was not a professional investor. He was a professional dancer. He and his dance partner Julia entertained at nightclubs around the world. And because he was not a professional, he got his chops in the school of hard knocks. He learned by doing. And he chronicles his progress, all the mistakes he made along the way, where his thinking went wrong, and how he eventually developed his own theory which made him $2 million in 18 months, starting with a stake of less than $25,000.

   Darvas got involved in the stock market quite by accident. In 1952 he was offered a dancing gig in Toronto. The twin brothers who owned the club, Al and Harry Smith, made Darvas an unusual offer. They wanted to pay him in shares of a Canadian junior mining company called Brilund. It was trading at 50 cents a share – 6000 shares worth $3000 for his appearance. Darvas was a bit skeptical as he knew stocks went up and down in price. The Smiths agreed to make up the difference in cash if the stock dropped below 50 cents for the six months following the deal. Darvas agreed.

   As it turns out, Darvas could not keep his playdate and felt badly about letting the brothers down. So he offered to buy the 6000 shares for $3000. He got the shares and forgot about them until he noticed two months later that the stock was up to $1.90. He sold and made an $8000 profit. His appetite, as they say, was whetted.

   Then began the education. He thought Canadian penny mining stocks were the cat’s meow. “I jumped in and out of the market like a grasshopper,” he writes. He became enamored of some, calling them his “pets”. And he started losing money. So he quit the Canadian market and opened an account with a broker on Wall Street.

   His education continued. He followed broker tips. He subscribed to newsletters. He read books. He tried fundamental analysis. And he over-traded like crazy. When Rayonier went from $50 to $100, he was in and out three times picking up $5 here, $8 there and $2 in his last trade. He made $13 a share on Rayonier instead of $50.

   When he found out about industry groups, he decided buying the strongest stock in the strongest industry was a good idea. He was so convinced he was on to a sure thing he mortgaged some property he owned in Las Vegas, borrowed on an insurance policy and plunked down $50,000 on steel company Jones & McLaughlin using margin. Three days later “lightning struck. Jones & McLaughlin began to drop.” He was stunned. He held on believing it to be a temporary setback. He became afraid. “I trembled when I telephoned my broker,” he writes. “I was scared when I opened the newspaper. I literally lived with my stock. I was watching it the way an anxious parent watches over his new-born child.”

   As you can tell, Darvas is a compelling writer. He grabs the reader’s attention. We’ve all been there, done that. We know what he’s talking about!

   But Darvas didn’t give up. And he went on to develop his own method of investing, a largely technical approach. He calls it the box theory and it works like this. He noticed that stocks fluctuate and stocks in an upwards trend will often pause and take a breather, fluctuating within a range. A box he called it. And he noticed that when the stock broke out of this box to the upside, it tended to go up further. And if it broke out to the downside, the trend was often broken.

   For example, if a stock was fluctuating between 45 and 50 dollars – a 45/50 box, if it broke through to 51, it would likely go higher. If it broke through to 44, it would likely go lower. So he would buy at 51 and set a stop loss for the top of the last box or 50. Darvas used very tight stops on his initial purchases. He reasoned that the stock had broken out of the box and it had no business going back in the box. If it did, then he made a mistake and wanted to get out as quickly as possible with as little damage as possible. He also looked to increased volume as a positive indicator.

   He was not averse to playing the same stock several times. For example, he played steel company Cooper-Bessemer three times between November 1956 and April 1957. Bought at 46, stopped out at 45 1/8; bought at 55 3/8, stopped out at 54; bought at 57 and sold for a hefty profit at 70 ¾. Two losses and a victory for an overall gain of over $1500. In the fall of 1957, a bear market developed but he had been stopped out of all his positions well ahead of it. His system had put him in cash when the market went south.

   Darvas was fascinated that he didn’t have to have theories or predictions about where the market in general was headed. The individual stocks told him the story by their behavior. And he learned you can’t get emotional about the market. “I accepted everything for what it was – not what I wanted it to be. I just stayed on the sidelines and waited for better times to come.”

   It was during this mini-bear that he made an important discovery. He read the stock reports daily. He noticed some stocks gave ground grudgingly, fighting the down trend. Checking these stocks further, he discovered they were growing earnings. “Capital was flowing into these stocks, even in a bad market. This capital was following earning improvements as a dog follows a scent.”

   And so he married this fundamental idea to his technical box theory. “I would select stocks on their technical action in the market, but I would only buy them when I could give improving earning power as my fundamental reason for doing so.”

   And he decided to focus on “those stocks that were tied up with the future and where I could expect revolutionary new products would sharply improve the company’s earnings.” Yes, he became a tech stock investor…way back in the 1950s. “They were rapidly-expanding, infant industries and, unless something unforeseen happened, their expansion should soon be reflected in the market.”

   You may notice some striking similarities to Jesse Livermore’s approach. Others were the idea of probing the market, that is buying a bit now, a bit more on confirmation and still more after that. In fact, like Livermore, Darvas was a plunger. He bought few stocks. After he made a million, he re-invested the proceeds in just two stocks!

   Darvas’s book is a fascinating read. It’s almost as valuable for the discussion of the mistakes he made as for his successes. And it reads like an adventure story, a compelling page turner. Get it! You won’t be disappointed.

Source: http://www.superstockpicker.com


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